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Appendix G - IPSEC
400
BLACK BOX
®
Advanced Console Server
auto
What operation, if any, should be done automatically at IPsec startup; cur-
rently-accepted values are
add
(signifying an
ipsec auto --add
),
route
(sig-
nifying that plus an
ipsec auto --route
),
start
(signifying that plus an
ipsec
auto --up
), and
ignore
(also the default) (signifying no automatic startup
operation). This parameter is ignored unless the
plutoload
or
plutostart
configuration parameter is set suitably; see the
config setup
discussion
below.
auth
Whether authentication should be done as part of ESP encryption, or sep-
arately using the AH protocol, acceptable values are
esp
(the default) and
ah
.
authby
How the two security gateways should authenticate each other. Accept-
able values are
secret
for shared secrets (the default) and
rsasig
for RSA
digital signatures.
leftid
How the left participant should be identified for authentication. Defaults
to left. Can be an IP address or a fully-qualified domain name preceded by
@ (which is used as a literal string and not resolved).
leftrsasigkey
The left participant's public key for RSA signature authentication, in RFC
2537 format. The magic value
%none
means the same as not specifying a
value (useful to override a default). The value
%dnsondemand
means the
key is to be fetched from DNS at the time it is needed. The value
%dnson-
load
means the key is to be fetched from DNS at the time the connection
description is read from
ipsec.conf
. Currently this is treated as
%none
if
right=%any
or
right=%opportunistic
. The value
%dns
is currently treated
as
%dnsonload
but will change to
%dnsondemand
in the future. The
identity used for the left participant must be a specific host, not
%any
or
another magic value.
Caution
: if two connection descriptions specify dif-
ferent public keys for the same
leftid
, confusion and madness will ensue.
pfs
Whether Perfect Forward Secrecy of keys is desired on the connection's
keying channel. (With PFS, penetration of the key-exchange protocol
does not compromise keys negotiated earlier.) Acceptable values are
yes
(the default) and
no
.