Chapter 36: PKI Certificates and SSL
434
Section IX: Management Security
Certificate
Validation
To validate a certificate, the end entity verifies the signature in the
certificate, using the public key of the CA who issued the certificate.
CA Hierarchies and Certificate Chains
It may not be practical for every individual certificate in an organization to
be signed by one certification authority. A certification hierarchy may be
formed, in which one CA (for example, national headquarters) is declared
to be the root CA. This CA issues certificates to the next level down in the
hierarchy (for example, regional headquarters), who become subordinate
CAs and issue certificates to the next level down, and so on. A hierarchy
may have as many levels as needed.
Certificate hierarchies allow validation of certificates through certificate
chains and cross-certification. If a switch X, which holds a certificate
signed by CA X, wishes to communicate securely with a switch Y, which
holds a certificate signed by CA Y, there are two ways in which the
switches can validate each other’s certificates. Cross-certification occurs
when switch X validates switch Y's CA (CA Y) by obtaining a certificate for
switch Y's CA which has been issued by its own CA (CA X)
.
A certificate
chain is formed if both CA X and CA Y hold a certificate signed by a root
CA Z, which the switches have verified out of band. Switch X can validate
switch Y’s certificate (and vice versa) by following the chain up to CA Z.
Root CA Certificates
A root CA must sign its own certificate. The root CA is the most critical link
in the certification chain, because the validity of all certificates issued by
any CA in the hierarchy depends on the root CA’s validity. Therefore,
every device which uses the root CA’s certificate must verify it out-of-
band.
Out-of-band verification involves both the owner of a certificate and the
user who wishes to verify that certificate generating a one-way hash (a
fingerprint) of the certificate. These two hashes must then be compared
using at least one non-network-based communication method. Examples
of suitable communication methods are mail, telephone, fax, or transfer by
hand from a storage device such as a smart card or floppy disk. If the two
hashes are the same, the certificate can be considered valid.
Certificate
Revocation Lists
(CRLs)
A certificate may become invalid because some of the details in it change
(for example, the address changes), because the relationship between the
Certification Authority (CA) and the subject changes (for example, an
employee leaves a company), or because the associated private key is
compromised. Every CA is required to keep a publicly accessible list of its
certificates which have been revoked.
Summary of Contents for AT-S63
Page 14: ...Figures 14 ...
Page 18: ...Tables 18 ...
Page 28: ...28 Section I Basic Operations ...
Page 58: ...Chapter 1 Overview 58 ...
Page 76: ...Chapter 2 AT 9400Ts Stacks 76 Section I Basic Operations ...
Page 96: ...Chapter 5 MAC Address Table 96 Section I Basic Operations ...
Page 114: ...Chapter 8 Port Mirror 114 Section I Basic Operations ...
Page 116: ...116 Section II Advanced Operations ...
Page 146: ...Chapter 12 Access Control Lists 146 Section II Advanced Operations ...
Page 176: ...Chapter 14 Quality of Service 176 Section II Advanced Operations ...
Page 196: ...196 Section III Snooping Protocols ...
Page 204: ...Chapter 18 Multicast Listener Discovery Snooping 204 Section III Snooping Protocols ...
Page 216: ...Chapter 20 Ethernet Protection Switching Ring Snooping 216 Section III Snooping Protocols ...
Page 218: ...218 Section IV SNMPv3 ...
Page 234: ...234 Section V Spanning Tree Protocols ...
Page 268: ...268 Section VI Virtual LANs ...
Page 306: ...Chapter 27 Protected Ports VLANs 306 Section VI Virtual LANs ...
Page 320: ...320 Section VII Internet Protocol Routing ...
Page 360: ...Chapter 30 BOOTP Relay Agent 360 Section VII Routing ...
Page 370: ...Chapter 31 Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol 370 Section VII Routing ...
Page 372: ...372 Section VIII Port Security ...
Page 402: ...Chapter 33 802 1x Port based Network Access Control 402 Section VIII Port Security ...
Page 404: ...404 Section IX Management Security ...
Page 436: ...Chapter 36 PKI Certificates and SSL 436 Section IX Management Security ...
Page 454: ...Chapter 38 TACACS and RADIUS Protocols 454 Section IX Management Security ...
Page 462: ...Chapter 39 Management Access Control List 462 Section IX Management Security ...
Page 532: ...Appendix D MIB Objects 532 ...