3e-525A–3 Wireless Access Point
Appendix A: Misuse Guidelines
A-2
29000167-001 B
The TOE may initially operate in an
unsafe state since wireless encryption
The TOE may initially operate in an
The TOE may initially operate in an
is not initially turned on.
unsafe state since wireless encryption
unsafe state since wireless encryption
The TOE factory default settings ini-
tialize such that the wireless radio is
The TOE factory default settings ini-
The TOE factory default settings ini-
off and must be manually confi gured.
The manual confi guration prompts for
off and must be manually confi gured.
off and must be manually confi gured.
encryption and for static or dynamic
The manual confi guration prompts for
The manual confi guration prompts for
key management so the user cannot
encryption and for static or dynamic
encryption and for static or dynamic
forget to enable encryption.
key management so the user cannot
key management so the user cannot
A client has been probing a TOE using
different SSIDs (Service Set Identifi ers)
A client has been probing a TOE using
A client has been probing a TOE using
in each probe. This may indicate an at-
tacker’s attempt to guess the network
in each probe. This may indicate an at-
in each probe. This may indicate an at-
SSID, which could allow the attacker
tacker’s attempt to guess the network
tacker’s attempt to guess the network
to gain access to the network.
Only client devices that belong to the
approved MAC address list are al-
Only client devices that belong to the
Only client devices that belong to the
lowed to join the network, and these
approved MAC address list are al-
approved MAC address list are al-
clients are provided with the SSID
lowed to join the network, and these
lowed to join the network, and these
a priori
. All other client devices are
clients are provided with the SSID
clients are provided with the SSID
blocked from associating to the TOE.
a priori
a priori
A wireless client device may fail au-
thentication to the TOE, then repeat-
A wireless client device may fail au-
A wireless client device may fail au-
edly try to re-authenticate in order to
thentication to the TOE, then repeat-
thentication to the TOE, then repeat-
guess passwords or glean information
edly try to re-authenticate in order to
edly try to re-authenticate in order to
about how to pass authentication.
guess passwords or glean information
guess passwords or glean information
The TOE supports a policy such that
following repeated failed authentica-
The TOE supports a policy such that
The TOE supports a policy such that
tion attempts, a client device is added
following repeated failed authentica-
following repeated failed authentica-
to a “cannot join” list and is prevented
tion attempts, a client device is added
tion attempts, a client device is added
from accessing the wireless network.
to a “cannot join” list and is prevented
to a “cannot join” list and is prevented
An administrator, including the
Crypto Offi cer, may incorrectly install
An administrator, including the
An administrator, including the
or confi gure the TOE resulting in inef-
Crypto Offi cer, may incorrectly install
Crypto Offi cer, may incorrectly install
fective security mechanisms.
or confi gure the TOE resulting in inef-
or confi gure the TOE resulting in inef-
The TOE provides administrators,
including Crypto Offi cers, with the
The TOE provides administrators,
The TOE provides administrators,
necessary information for secure man-
including Crypto Offi cers, with the
including Crypto Offi cers, with the
agement.
Lack of or insuffi cient tests to dem-
onstrate that all TOE security func-
tions operate correctly (including in a
onstrate that all TOE security func-
onstrate that all TOE security func-
fi elded TOE) may result in incorrect
tions operate correctly (including in a
tions operate correctly (including in a
TOE behavior being undiscovered
fi elded TOE) may result in incorrect
fi elded TOE) may result in incorrect
thereby causing potential security
TOE behavior being undiscovered
TOE behavior being undiscovered
vulnerabilities.
thereby causing potential security
thereby causing potential security
The TOE provides the capability to
test the TSF to ensure the correct op-
The TOE provides the capability to
The TOE provides the capability to
eration of the TSF at a customer site.
test the TSF to ensure the correct op-
test the TSF to ensure the correct op-
Power-on and conditional self-test
suites have been evaluated during the
FIPS 140-2 validation process for the
suites have been evaluated during the
suites have been evaluated during the
TOE.
A user or process may cause, through
an unsophisticated attack, TSF data,
A user or process may cause, through
A user or process may cause, through
or executable code to be inappropri-
an unsophisticated attack, TSF data,
an unsophisticated attack, TSF data,
ately accessed (viewed, modifi ed, or
or executable code to be inappropri-
or executable code to be inappropri-
deleted).
ately accessed (viewed, modifi ed, or
ately accessed (viewed, modifi ed, or
The TOE provides functions and facili-
ties necessary to support the admin-
The TOE provides functions and facili-
The TOE provides functions and facili-
istrators, including Crypto Offi cer, in
ties necessary to support the admin-
ties necessary to support the admin-
their management of the security of
istrators, including Crypto Offi cer, in
istrators, including Crypto Offi cer, in
the TOE, and restrict these functions
their management of the security of
their management of the security of
and facilities from unauthorized use.
A user may gain access to services
(either on the TOE or by sending data
A user may gain access to services
A user may gain access to services
through the TOE) for which they are
(either on the TOE or by sending data
(either on the TOE or by sending data
not authorized according to the TOE
through the TOE) for which they are
through the TOE) for which they are
security policy.
not authorized according to the TOE
not authorized according to the TOE
The TOE mediates the fl ow of infor-
mation to and from wireless clients
communicating via the TOE RF
Transmitter/Receiver interface in
communicating via the TOE RF
communicating via the TOE RF
accordance with its FIPS 140-2 public
security policy.
accordance with its FIPS 140-2 public
accordance with its FIPS 140-2 public
A user or process may gain unauthor-
ized access to data through realloca-
A user or process may gain unauthor-
A user or process may gain unauthor-
tion of TOE resources from one user or
ized access to data through realloca-
ized access to data through realloca-
process to another.
The TOE ensures that any informa-
tion contained in a protected resource
The TOE ensures that any informa-
The TOE ensures that any informa-
within its Scope of Control is not
tion contained in a protected resource
tion contained in a protected resource
released when the resource is real-
within its Scope of Control is not
within its Scope of Control is not
located. All relevant Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) within the TOE are
located. All relevant Critical Security
located. All relevant Critical Security
zeroized when the resource is real-
located. This CSP zeroization has
been evaluated within the FIPS 140-2
validation process.
