IPsec parameters
Digi TransPort User Guide
424
Mode
The negotiation mode. The options are:
• Main
• Aggressive
Historically, fixed IP addresses have been used in setting up IPSec tunnels. Today it is more
common, particularly with Internet ISPs, to dynamically allocate the user a temporary IP
address as part of the process of connecting to the Internet. In this case, the source IP address
of the party trying to initiate the tunnel is variable and cannot be pre-configured.
In
Main
mode, such as non-aggressive, the source IP address must be known such as this
mode can only be used over the Internet if the ISP provides a fixed IP address to the user or
you are using X.509 certificates.
Aggressive
mode was developed to allow the host to identify a remote unit (initiator) from an
ID string rather than from its IP address. This means that it can be used over the Internet via
an ISP that dynamically allocates IP addresses. It also has two other noticeable differences
from main mode. Firstly, it uses fewer messages to complete the phase 1 exchange (3
compared to 5) and so will execute a little more quickly, particularly on networks with large
turn-around delays such as GPRS. Secondly, as more information is sent unencrypted during
the exchange, it is potentially less secure than a normal mode exchange.
Note
Main mode can be used without knowing the remote unit’s IP address when using
certificates. This is because the ID of the remote unit (its public key) can be retrieved from
the certificate file.
MODP Group for Phase 1
The key length used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman exchange to
768
bits (group 1) or
1024
bits
(group 2). Normally this option is set to
group 1
; this is sufficient for normal use. For
particularly sensitive applications, you can improve security by selecting
group 2
to enable a
1024 bit key length. Note, however, that this will slow down the process of generating the
phase 1 session keys (typically from 1-2 seconds for group 1), to 4-5 seconds.
MODP Group for Phase 2
The minimum width of the numeric field used in the calculations for phase 2 of the security
exchange. With
No PFS
(Perfect Forwarding Security) selected, the data transferred during
phase 1 can be reused to generate the keys for the phase 2 SAs, hence speeding up
connections. However, in doing this it is possible (though very unlikely), that if the phase 1
keys were compromised (such as discovered by a third party), the phase 2 keys might be more
easily compromised. Enabling group
1
(
768
) or
2
(
1024
) or
3
(
1536
), IPSec MODP forces the key
calculation for phase 2 to use new data that has no relationship to the phase 1 data and
initiates a second Diffie-Hellman exchange. This provides an even greater level of security, but
can take longer to complete.
Renegotiate after h hrs m mins s secs
How long the initial IKE Security Association stays in force. When this time expires, any
attempt to send packets to the remote system results in IKE attempting to establish a new SA.
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