Belkin®
Secure
DVI
KVM
Switch,
Secure
KM
Switch
and
Secure
Windowing
KVM
EAL
4
augmented
ALC_FLR.3
Security
Target
Rev.
1.01
Page
|
24
3
Security
Problem
Definition
This
section
describes
assumptions
about
the
operational
environment
in
which
the
TOE
is
intended
to
be
used
and
represents
the
conditions
for
the
secure
operation
of
the
TOE.
Note:
The
content
in
this
section
is
appears
in
the
Security
Problem
Definition
of
the
claimed
PSS
PP
and
is
copied
here
for
completeness.
3.1
Secure
Usage
Assumptions
The
Security
Objectives
and
Security
Functional
Requirements
defined
in
subsequent
sections
of
this
Security
Target
are
based
on
the
condition
that
all
of
the
assumptions
described
in
this
section
are
satisfied.
Assumption
Definition
A.ACCESS
An
AUTHORIZED
USER
possesses
the
necessary
privileges
to
access
the
information
transferred
by
the
TOE.
USERS
are
AUTHORIZED
USERS.
A.MANAGE
The
TOE
is
installed
and
managed
in
accordance
with
the
manufacturer’s
directions.
A.NOEVIL
The
AUTHORIZED
USER
is
non
‐
hostile
and
follows
all
usage
guidance.
A.PHYSICAL
The
TOE
is
physically
secure.
Table
2
–
Secure
usage
assumptions
3.2
Threats
The
assets
under
attack
are
one
or
more
of
the
following:
1.
The
information
that
is
transiting
the
TOE
(e.g.
information
typed
by
the
user
on
user
keyboard).
2.
The
information
that
is
residing
in
networks
connected
to
the
COMPUTERS
that
are
coupled
to
the
TOE
(e.g.
the
risk
of
data
leakages
across
the
TOE
between
coupled
isolated
networks).
3.
The
integrity
of
the
networks
coupled
to
the
COMPUTERS
that
are
coupled
to
the
TOE
(e.g.
the
risk
of
network
attacks
or
DoS
on
coupled
networks
from
TOE).
In
general,
the
threat
agent
may
be
one
or
more
of:
1.
People
with
TOE
access
(who
are
expected
to
possess
“average”
expertise,
few
resources,
and
moderate
motivation).
2.
Failure
of
the
TOE
or
PERIPHERALS.
3.
Infected
COMPUTERS
or
NETWORKS
coupled
to
the
TOE.
