Belkin®
Secure
DVI
KVM
Switch,
Secure
KM
Switch
and
Secure
Windowing
KVM
EAL
4
augmented
ALC_FLR.3
Security
Target
Rev.
1.01
Page
|
32
GROUP
ID.
important
for
DEVICES
with
bi
‐
directional
communications
channels
such
as
KEYBOARD
and
POINTING
DEVICES.
Since
many
PERIPHERALS
now
have
embedded
microprocessors
or
microcontrollers,
significant
amounts
of
information
may
be
transferred
from
one
COMPUTER
system
to
another,
resulting
in
compromise
of
sensitive
information.
An
example
of
this
is
transfer
via
the
buffering
mechanism
in
many
KEYBOARDS.
Further,
the
purpose
of
the
TOE
is
to
share
a
set
of
PERIPHERALS
among
multiple
COMPUTERS.
Information
transferred
to/from
one
SWITCHED
COMPUTER
is
not
to
be
shared
with
any
other
COMPUTER.
T.ROM_PROG
The
TSF
may
be
modified
by
an
attacker
such
that
code
embedded
in
reprogrammable
ROMs
is
overwritten,
thus
leading
to
a
compromise
of
the
separation
‐
enforcing
components
of
the
code
and
subsequent
compromise
of
the
data
flowing
through
the
TOE.
O.ROM
This
Objective
assures
that
TOE
software/firmware
will
be
protected
against
unauthorized
modification.
Embedded
software
must
be
contained
in
mask
‐
programmed,
fuse
protected
flash
or
one
‐
time
‐
programmable
read
‐
only
memory
permanently
attached
(non
‐
socketed)
to
a
circuit
assembly.
O.ROM
The
threat
of
software
(firmware)
embedded
in
reprogrammable
ROMs
is
mitigated
by
ensuring
that
the
ROMs
used
in
the
TSF
to
hold
embedded
TSF
data
are
not
physically
able
to
be
re
‐
programmed.
Thus,
even
if
an
interface
does
exist
to
the
ROM
containing
the
embedded
TSF
code,
high
confidence
can
be
obtained
that
that
code
(stored
in
the
ROM)
will
remain
unchanged
together
with
the
TOE
security
functions.
