Belkin®
Secure
DVI
KVM
Switch,
Secure
KM
Switch
and
Secure
Windowing
KVM
EAL
4
augmented
ALC_FLR.3
Security
Target
Rev.
1.01
Page
|
36
O.UNIDIR
TOE
circuitry
shall
assure
that
USER
KEYBOARD,
USER
POINTING
DEVICE
and
EDID
data
will
flow
only
from
PERIPHERAL
DEVICES
to
the
SWITCHED
COUPLED
COMPUTER.
O.TAMPER
The
TOE
Device
provides
unambiguous
detection
of
physical
tampering
of
the
TSF's
devices
or
TSF's
enclosure,
and
to
permanently
disables
TOE
normal
functionality
after
such
an
event.
been
altered.
O.UNIDIR
This
objective
will
ensure
that
console
KEYBOARD
and
POINTING
DEVICE
data
will
only
flow
through
the
TOE
in
one
direction
from
PERIPHERAL
DEVICES
to
the
SWITCHED
COUPLED
COMPUTER,
thereby
preventing
data
transfer
from
connected
COMPUTERS
or
NETWORKS
to
peripheral
devices.
O.TAMPER
Tampering
of
the
TOE
may
cause
data
to
be
transferred
between
COMPUTERS.
Detection
of
a
physical
tampering
attempt
may
prevent
such
an
event,
or
will
permanently
disable
the
TOE
after
detection
of
such
event.
T.TAMPER
An
unidentified
threat
agent
could
physically
tamper
with
or
modify
the
TOE,
allowing
unauthorized
information
flows.
O.TAMPER
The
TOE
Device
provides
unambiguous
detection
of
physical
tampering
of
the
TSF's
devices
or
TSF's
enclosure,
and
permanently
disables
TOE
normal
functionality
after
such
an
event.
O.TAMPER
The
TOE
contains
mechanisms
that
provide
unambiguous
indication
of
a
physical
tampering
attempt
that
might
compromise
the
TSF,
and
permanently
disable
the
TOE
after
such
an
event.
Table
7
–
TOE
Security
Objectives
rationale
