Belkin®
Secure
DVI
KVM
Switch,
Secure
KM
Switch
and
Secure
Windowing
KVM
EAL
4
augmented
ALC_FLR.3
Security
Target
Rev.
1.01
Page
|
41
EXT_IUC.1.1
All
USB
devices
connected
to
the
Peripheral
switch
shall
be
interrogated
to
ensure
that
they
are
valid
(pointing
device,
keyboard,
user
authentication
device,
display).
No
further
interaction
with
non
‐
valid
devices
shall
be
performed.
5.3
Class
EXT:
Extended
–
ROM
(EXT_ROM)
The
ROM
requirement
protects
the
TOE
from
remote
tampering
by
re
‐
programming
of
programmable
components
in
the
TOE.
The
use
of
non
‐
volatile
memory
with
mask
ROM,
OTP
(One
Time
Programming)
or
fused
write
protection
assures
that
firmware
may
not
be
changed
after
TOE
production.
All
non
‐
volatile
memory
devices
used
must
be
soldered
directly
to
the
board
(not
attached
with
a
socket).
Family
Behavior
This
family
defines
the
read
‐
only
(write
‐
protection)
feature
required
to
protect
the
firmware
stored
on
all
TOE
non
‐
volatile
memory
devices.
Component
Leveling
EXT_ROM
Read
only
ROM,
requires
that
the
TSF
disable
all
attempts
to
re
‐
write
data
to
the
TOE
non
‐
volatile
memory.
Management:
EXT_ROM.1
There
are
no
management
activities
foreseen.
Audit:
EXT_ROM.1
There
are
no
auditable
events
foreseen.
EXT_ROM.1
Read
Only
ROMs
Hierarchical
to:
No
other
components.
Dependencies:
No
dependencies.
EXT_ROM.1.1
TSF
software
embedded
in
TSF
ROMs
must
be
contained
in
mask
‐
programmed
or
one
‐
time
‐
programmable
read
‐
only
memory
permanently
attached
(non
‐
socketed)
to
a
circuit
assembly.
