CHAPTER 1 Planning Your Configuration
Before you begin the Audit init process, have your white PED Keys ready, either with an existing Auditor secret to
reuse, or blank (or outdated secret) to be overwritten by a unique new Auditor secret generated by the HSM.
Secure Recovery Purple PED Key (SRK)
The Secure Recovery Vector is imprinted onto a purple Secure Recovery Key, only if you have invoked SRK. The
Master Tamper Key and the recovery components (one of which can be brought outside the HSM and kept on a purple
PED Key) are explained elsewhere. What you need to know is that there is no need to create a purple PED Key unless
you :
•
need to enforce acknowledgment of tamper events by your personnel, before returning the HSM to service, or
•
wish to invoke Secure Transport Mode.
When you invoke SRK, to remove one of the MTK recovery secret splits from the HSM and imprint it onto a purple PED
Key, the PED prompt sequence DOES NOT include a "reuse" option. The purple PED Key is the only one that is unique
to its HSM and cannot be reused. The secret is generated within the HSM and goes onto a purple PED Key (or several,
if you choose M of N), but there is no ability for the HSM to accept an already imprinted purple key secret that came
from another HSM. SRKs are always unique. That is, you can make as many copies as you wish, but they will work
with only one HSM in the world.
Other than that, the PED prompt sequence is similar to the sequence for the blue or black PED keys, with the same
questions/choices for you to make about M of N, about duplicates, etc.
Before you begin the SRK process, have your purple PED Keys ready, either a blank key, or outdated secret, to be
overwritten by a unique new Secure Recovery Vector generated by the HSM.
Other Considerations
In each case, have your materials and notes about your previously-made decisions on hand before you launch a
command that invokes key creation or imprinting.
Predetermine which of your personnel will have access to which PED Keys, how many people should be required to
perform a given authentication action, whether they will carry their PED Key(s), or will need to retrieve them from a
secure lockup for each occasion that they are used, how many backup sets you expect to maintain.
Keep in mind that backups are good, but each backup set must be updated if the operational or master set is changed
for any reason.
If your security policies do not require periodic changes to PED Key secrets (possible for any of the other PED Keys,
but effectively impossible for red domain PED Keys), and if your physical and procedural security is strong enough,
then it is quite possible to just create the set(s) of PED Keys that you need, and then not need to touch them again for
years.
By contrast, if your policies demand periodic change, or if you think you might be forced to change PED Key secrets
due to personnel departures or other events, then have a clear plan in place about how you will deal with such situations
before you create your various PED Key sets.
Luna PED Planning
Plan your PED Key options and choices before you begin the actions that will invoke PED Keys.
The various PED Keys contain secrets that are created by an HSM, and are imprinted on the PED Key at the time that
a triggering action is called - for example,both the HSM and a blue SO PED Key are imprinted with the HSM SO secret
Luna SA Configuration Guide
Release 5.4.1 007-011136-007 Rev C July 2014 Copyright 2014 SafeNet, Inc. All rights reserved.
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