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D1054 

- SIL 2 Repeater Power Supply and Trip Amplifiers 

G.M. International ISM0067-18 

Functional Safety Manual and Application 

Application for D1054S , active input and 4-20 mA analog current output

 

Failure category

 

Failure rates (FIT)

 

λ

dd

 = Total Dangerous Detected failures 

105.54 

λ

du

 = Total Dangerous Undetected failures 

42.58 

λ

sd

 = Total Safe Detected failures 

0.00 

λ

su

 = Total Safe Undetected failures 

112.15 

λ

tot safe

 = Total Failure Rate (Safety Function) = 

λ

dd

 + 

λ

du

 + 

λ

sd

 + 

λ

su

 260.27 

MTBF (safety function, single channel) = (1 / 

λ

tot safe

) + MTTR (8 hours) 

439 years 

λ

no effect

 = “No Effect” failures 

195.43 

λ

not part

 = “Not Part” failures 

269.40 

λ

tot device

 = Total Failure Rate (Device) = 

λ

tot safe

 + 

λ

no effect

 + 

λ

not part

  

725.10 

MTBF (device) = (1 / 

λ

tot device

) + MTTR (8 hours) 

157 years 

λ

sd

 

λ

su

 

λ

dd

 

λ

du

 

DC

 

SFF

 

0.00 FIT 

112.15 FIT 

105.54 FIT 

42.58 FIT 

71.25% 

83.64% 

T[Proof] = 1 year

 

T[Proof] = 5 years

 

PFDavg = 1.88 E-04

 

Valid for 

SIL 2

  PFDavg = 9.40 E-04

 

Valid for 

SIL 2

 

PFDavg vs T[Proof] table 

(assuming Proof Test coverage of 99%), with determination of SIL supposing module contributes  >10% of total SIF dangerous failures: 

PFDavg vs T[Proof] table

 (assuming Proof Test coverage of 99%), with determination of SIL supposing module contributes  

10% of total SIF dangerous failures: 

Failure rates table according to IEC 61508:2010 Ed.2 : 

Failure rate table:

 

Safety Function and Failure behavior:

  

D1054S is considered to be operating in Low Demand mode, as a Type B module, having Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 0. 
The failure behaviour of module (only the 4 - 20 mA current output configuration is used for safety application) is described from the following definitions: 

Fail-Safe State: is defined as the output going to 0 mA due to module shutdown. 

Fail Safe: failure mode that causes the module / (sub)system to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand from the process. 

Fail Dangerous: failure mode that does not respond to a demand from the process or deviates the output current by more than 3 % (± 0.5 mA) of full span. 

Fail High: failure mode that causes the output signal to go above the maximum output current (> 20 mA). Assuming that the application program in the Safety logic solver is 
configured to detect High failure, this failure has been classified as a dangerous detected (DD) failure. 

Fail Low: failure mode that causes the output signal to go below the minimum output current (< 4 mA). Assuming that the application program in the Safety logic solver is 
configured to detect Low failure, this failure has been classified as a dangerous detected (DD) failure. 

Fail Dangerous Detected: it’s a dangerous failure which has been detected from module internal diagnostic so that output signal is forced below the minimum output current 
< 4 mA (as Fail Low) or above the maximum output current > 20mA (as Fail High). 

Fail “No Effect”: failure mode of a component that plays a part in implementing the safety function but that is neither a safe failure nor a dangerous failure.  
When calculating the SFF, this failure mode is not taken into account. 

Fail “Not part”: failure mode of a component which is not part of the safety function but part of the circuit diagram and is listed for completeness.  
When calculating the SFF this failure mode is not taken into account. 

As the module has been evaluated in accordance with Route 2H (proven-in-use) of the IEC 61508:2010, Diagnostic Coverage DC 

 60% is required for Type B elements. 

Being HFT = 0, in Low Demand mode the maximum achievable functional safety level is SIL 2. 
Failure rate date: taken from Siemens Standard SN29500. 

Description:

  

For this application, enable 4 - 20 mA Source mode (see pages 12 and 13 for more information). 
The module is powered by connecting 12-24 Vdc power supply to Pins 3 (+ positive) - 4 (- negative). The green LED is lit in presence of supply power. 
Active input signal from external powered Tx is applied to Pins 15-16. 
Source output current is applied to Pins 1-2. Alarm A and Alarm B Outputs are not used for functional safety purpose. 

T[Proof] = 10 years

 

PFDavg = 1.88 E-03

 

Valid for 

SIL 2

 

D1054S 

 

Supply  

 12-24 Vdc 

3 + 

4 - 

14 

15 

 

In 1 

16 

 

External 

Powered Tx 

Current Source 

 

1 + 

2 - 

Out 1 

Safety 

PLC 

Input 

 

Alarm A 

 

Alarm B 

Not used for functional safety purpose. 

where DC means the diagnostic coverage for the input sensor by module internal diagnostic circuits and by Safety logic solver. This type “B” system, operating in Low Demand mode 
with HFT = 0, has got DC = 71.25 % 

 60 % as required by Route 2H evaluation (proven-in-use) of the IEC 61508:2010. 

SC 2: Systematic capability SIL 2. 

Summary of Contents for D1054S

Page 1: ...D1054 SIL 2 Repeater Power Supply and Trip Amplifiers ISM0067 18 D1054S INSTRUCTION SAFETY MANUAL SIL 2 Repeater Power Supply and Trip Amplifiers Din Rail Model D1054S...

Page 2: ...ectional within 3 dB Hart and higher frequency protocols only with mA direct current output Alarm Trip point range within rated limits of input sensor see input for step resolution ON OFF delay time 0...

Page 3: ...10 V Output Signal linear or reverse Wide Band Smart Communication Hart compatible Input and Output short circuit proof Two independent trip amplifiers Output for burnout detection Common burnout dete...

Page 4: ...te powered intrinsically safe devices check that maximum allowable voltage current Ui Vmax Ii Imax of the D1054 Associated Apparatus are not exceeded by the safety parameters Uo Voc Io Isc of the Intr...

Page 5: ...r Entity Concept or third party approved for Division 2 installations the configuration of Intrinsically Safe Equipment must be FM approved under non incendive field wiring or Entity Concept or third...

Page 6: ...red to detect High failure this failure has been classified as a dangerous detected DD failure Fail Low failure mode that causes the output signal to go below the minimum output current 4 mA Assuming...

Page 7: ...mA of full span Fail High failure mode that causes the output signal to go above the maximum output current 20 mA Assuming that the application program in the Safety logic solver is configured to dete...

Page 8: ...of the circuit diagram and is listed for completeness When calculating the SFF this failure mode is not taken into account Both alarm A and B trip amplifiers must be programmed with equal configuratio...

Page 9: ...to not respond to a demand from the process i e being unable to go to the defined Fail Safe state so that the output relays remain energized or relay contacts remain closed Fail Dangerous Detected a d...

Page 10: ...l The proof test shall be performed to reveal dangerous faults which are undetected by diagnostic This means that it is necessary to specify how dangerous undetected fault which have been noted during...

Page 11: ...in Hazardous Area Hazardous Locations or unless area is known to be onhazardous Warning substitution of components may impair Intrinsic Safety and suitability for Division 2 Zone 2 Warning de energiz...

Page 12: ...and Down keys to select the number confirm the modification with the Enter key 8 Br HI 3 Level Menu Displays the Burnout HIGH Trip Point Value configuration Press Enter to set the burnout condition tr...

Page 13: ...ring range corresponding to defined low output value Upscale input value of measuring range corresponding to defined high output value Burnout Low low burnout condition trip point value below this val...

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