Final
Report № AIFN/0010/2018, issued on 10 January 2022
35
enhance take-off speeds calculations procedure for the flight crew by involving them in
these calculations to ensure that they are fully aware of the performance requirements for
stopping an aircraft on the runway.
SR45/2021
The Investigation believes that based on the statement from the Commander, the traits
demonstrated by the Copilot reflects that she was mentally affected to continue her
responsibilities as a pilot. Instead of returning to OMSJ, the Commander decided to
continue the flight, and eventually returned the controls to the Copilot. The Investigation
concludes that
the Commander’s decision to continue a training flight was not based on
thorough analysis of the facts surrounding the flight and the mental condition of the
Copilot.
It was noted that the Operator did not have in place a policy for handling situations where
one or both flight crewmembers is affected by a sudden event to possibly degrade
performance.
The Investigation recommends that the Operator to include in the
operation manual-part
A
(OM-A)
policy for crew resource management following degraded not categorized as
incapacitation.
4.3.2
Safety Recommendations addressed to Sharjah Air Navigation Service (SANS)
SR46/2021
The Investigation noted that sighting the direction of an aircraft holding at Bravo 14
intersection was obstructed by a light pole located at the aircraft parking stand a short
distance away from the standby tower. As the airport was not equipped with ground
movement radar, the only means for monitoring Bravo 14 intersection was the visual
watch. However, because of the obstruction of sighting Bravo 14 by the lighting pole, the
controllers should change their body position in order to see an aircraft holding at Bravo
14. The controllers could also use binoculars because Bravo 14 was located about 1 km
from Tower.
When SANS performed the safety case for use of the standby tower, the intersection
takeoff was not identified as a hazard, consequently no associative risk assessment was
performed.
SANS is recommended to explore the possibility of re-evaluating the risks surrounding
intersection takeoffs post this Incident, and prepare a safety case study, if needed, to
prevent similar incidents from occurring.
This Final Report is issued by:
The Air Accident Investigation Sector
General Civil Aviation Authority
The United Arab Emirates
e-mail: [email protected]
Содержание Airbus A320-214
Страница 46: ...Final Report AIFN 0010 2018 issued on 10 January 2022 36 Appendix A ABY111 Takeoff Along Runway 12 ...
Страница 47: ...Final Report AIFN 0010 2018 issued on 10 January 2022 37 Appendix B Sharjah Airport Chart ...
Страница 48: ...Final Report AIFN 0010 2018 issued on 10 January 2022 38 Appendix C Airbus Normal Checklist ...