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6.1.7
Class FTA: TOE access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated
termination
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies: No
dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a
[assignment: elapsed time of auto
logout, completion of document data reception from the printer driver, completion of
document data reception from the fax driver, and termination of communication with RC
Gate]
.
6.1.8
Class FTP: Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF
trusted
channel
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies: No
dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product
that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification
of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[assignment: communication
via the LAN of document data, function data, protected data, and confidential data, and
communication with RC Gate via the LAN]
.
6.2 Security
Assurance
Requirements
The evaluation assurance level of this TOE is EAL3+ALC_FLR.2. Table 27 lists the assurance components
of the TOE. ALC_FLR.2 was added to the set of components defined in evaluation assurance level 3
(EAL3).
Table 27 : TOE Security Assurance Requirements (EAL3+ALC_FLR.2)
Assurance Classes
Assurance Components
ADV_ARC.1 Security
architecture description
ADV_FSP.3
Functional specification with complete summary
ADV:
Development
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural
design
AGD_OPE.1 Operational
user
guidance
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation
controls
ALC:
Life-cycle support
ALC_CMS.3
Implementation representation CM coverage