Belkin F1DN102C, Руководство пользователя

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Belkin® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and
Secure Windowing KVM EAL 4 augmented ALC_FLR.3 Security Target Rev. 1.01
Page | 37
4.3.2 Security Objectives Rationale for the Operational Environment
Threats, Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
A.ACCESS
An AUTHORIZED USER
possesses the necessary
privileges to access the
information transferred
by the TOE. USERS are
AUTHORIZED USERS.
OE.ACCESS
The AUTHORIZED USER shall
possess the necessary privileges to
access the information transferred
by the TOE. USERS are AUTHORIZED
USERS.
All authorized users are
trustworthy individuals, having
background investigations
commensurate with the level of
data being protected, have
undergone appropriate training,
and follow all user guidance.
A.MANAGE
The TOE is installed and
managed in accordance
with the manufacturer’s
directions.
OE.MANAGE
The TOE shall be installed and
managed in accordance with the
manufacturer’s directions.
Restates the assumption.
A.NOEVIL
The AUTHORIZED USER is
non ‐ hostile and follows
all usage guidance.
OE.NOEVIL
The AUTHORIZED USER shall be
non ‐ hostile and follow all usage
guidance.
Restates the assumption.
A.PHYSICAL
The TOE is physically
secure.
OE.PHYSICAL
The TOE shall be physically secure.
The TOE is assumed to be held in
a secure site protected from
physical attack (e.g., theft or
destruction)
2
. Physical attack
could include unauthorized
intruders into the TOE
environment, but it does not
include physical destructive
actions that might be taken by an
individual that is authorized to
access the TOE environment.
Table 8 – Operational Environment Security Objectives rationale
2
The objective and rational here differs slightly from the PP because the TOE provides addition protections that
are attributed to the TOE environment in the PP. It should be also noted that although the operating environment
assumed to be physically secure, the TOE may be exposed to tampering while in transit to its operation site.