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11 

D5290S-078 

- 5 A SIL 3 Relay Output Module 

G.M. International ISM0152-8 

The proof test shall be performed to reveal dangerous faults which are undetected by diagnostic. This means that it is necessary to specify how dangerous undetected faults, which 
have been noted during the FMEDA, can be revealed during proof test. The Proof test consists of the following steps: 

Testing procedure at T-proof 

 

Steps

 

Action

 

1

 

Bypass the safety-related PLC or take other appropriate action to avoid a false trip when removing the unit for test. 

2

 

Verify the input-to-output functionality, considering the input signal and each relay output contact state: 

 Out S_1 (NO contact) at terminals “13”-“14”: when input is energized, Out S_1 must be closed; 

    while shutdown of the input channel, Out S_1 must be open; 

 Out S_2 (NO contact) at terminals “15”-“16”: when input is energized, Out S_2 must be closed; 

    while shutdown of the input channel, Out S_2 must be open; 

 Out P_1 (2 NC contacts in parallel connection) at terminals “17”-“18”: when input is energized, Out P_1 must be open; 

    while shutdown of the input channel, Out P_1 must be closed; 

 Out S_3 (NO contact) at terminals “23”-“24”: when input is energized, Out S_3 must be closed; 

    while shutdown of the input channel, Out S_3 must be open; 

 Out S_4 (NO contact) at terminals “21”-“22”: when input is energized, Out S_4 must be closed; 

    while shutdown of the input channel, Out S_4 must be open; 

 Out P_2 (2 NC contacts in parallel connection) at terminals “19”-“20”: when input is energized, Out P_2 must be open; 

    while shutdown of the input channel, Out P_2 must be closed. 

The channel functionality must be verified for a min to max input voltage change (21.6 to 27.6 Vdc). 
In addition is possible to check the Out P_1 and Out P_2 (which are the parallel connection of 2 NC contacts), imposing (by internal DIP-switches n°1, 3, 5) 
the short circuit of each single relay coil and to verify the ohmic continuity of the contacts, as described in the following procedure. 

1.  Do not supply the input channel (terminals “1”-“2”, or “3”-“4”) of module under test and verify that the ohmic continuity at the output contact terminals 

“17”-“18” (Out P_1) or “19”-“20” (Out P_2) is present (i.e. the parallel connection of the 2 NC contacts is closed: the 

1

st

 requisite is verified

). But this 

condition could also be true if only one contact is closed and other is blocked (for welding) into closed or open position: this will be verified testing the 
channel when input is supplied (see the 2

nd

 point). Instead, the absence of ohmic continuity implies that all relay contacts are blocked (for welding) into 

open position. 

2.  Supply the input channel (terminals “1”-“2”, or “3”-“4”) of module under test and verify that the ohmic continuity at the output contacts terminals 

“17”-“18” (Out P_1) or “19”-“20” (Out P_2) is absent (i.e. the parallel connection of the 2 NC contacts is open: the 

2

th

 requisite is verified

). 

The presence of ohmic continuity implies that at least one relay contact is blocked (for welding) into closed position: this could only be verified after 
disassembling and individually testing each relay. Instead, to verify if a contact is blocked (for welding) into open position, use internal DIP-switches 
(n°1, 3, 5) to put in short circuit one relay coil at a time (starting with the 2

nd

 coil by DIP-switch n°3, then going on with the 3

rd

 one by DIP-switch n°5 

(for “17”-“18” Out P_1) or with the 1

st

 one by DIP-switch n°1 (for “19”-“20” Out P_2)), verifying that the ohmic continuity is always present between 

terminals “17”-“18” (Out P_1) or “19”-“20” (Out P_2). In this situation, the absence of ohmic continuity implies that a relay contact (the only one with 
de-energized coil) is blocked (for welding) into open position. 

3

 

Remove the bypass from the safety-related PLC or restore normal operation inserting the unit. 

This test reveals almost 99% of all possible Dangerous Undetected failures in the relay module. 

Summary of Contents for D5290S-078

Page 1: ...IL 3 Relay Output Module G M International ISM0152 8 5 A SIL 3 Relay Output Module for NE or ND Loads with NE or ND Relay condition DIN Rail and Termination Board Model D5290S 078 D5290S 078 INSTRUCTI...

Page 2: ...14 conforms to EN60079 0 EN60079 15 IECEx BVS 10 0072 X conforms to IEC60079 0 IEC60079 15 INMETRO DNV 13 0109 X conforms to ABNT NBR IEC60079 0 ABNT NBR IEC60079 15 UL C UL E477485 conforms to ANSI U...

Page 3: ...tion n 6 Systematic capability SIL 3 Installation in Zone 2 Division 2 5 A SIL 3 SIL 2 contacts for NE or ND loads with NE or ND Relay condition 8 A inrush current at 30 Vdc 250 Vac Line input monitor...

Page 4: ...tor 22 21 19 20 23 24 Out S_1 NO contact 13 14 Out P_1 NC contact 17 18 16 15 Out S_2 NO contact Out S_4 NO contact Out P_2 NC contact Out S_3 NO contact To prevent relay contacts from damaging connec...

Page 5: ...operation of relay module is energized with NE Normally Energized loads In case of alarm or request from process the relay module is de energized safe state de energizing loads The failure behaviour o...

Page 6: ...ication the normal state operation of relay module is energized with NE Normally Energized loads In case of alarm or request from process the relay module is de energized safe state de energizing load...

Page 7: ...nd mode as a Type A module having Hardware Fault Tolerance HFT 0 In the 3rd Functional Safety application the normal state operation of relay module is energized with NE Normally Energized loads In ca...

Page 8: ...energized with ND Normally De energized loads In case of alarm or request from process the relay module is de energized safe state energizing loads The failure behaviour of all relay modules here cons...

Page 9: ...ribed by the following definitions fail Safe State it is defined as the output load being energized fail Safe this failure causes the system to go to the defined fail safe state without a process dema...

Page 10: ...s a Type A module having Hardware Fault Tolerance HFT 0 In the 6th Functional Safety application the normal state operation of relay module is de energized with ND loads In case of alarm or request fr...

Page 11: ...5 the short circuit of each single relay coil and to verify the ohmic continuity of the contacts as described in the following procedure 1 Do not supply the input channel terminals 1 2 or 3 4 of modul...

Page 12: ...i e IP54 to IP65 or NEMA type 12 13 consistent with the effective operating environment of the specific installation Units must be protected against dirt dust extreme mechanical e g vibration impact a...

Page 13: ...g ON 1 line input monitoring 2 low voltage input monitoring 3 short circuit fault detection 4 T proof relay testing DIP switch configurations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ON OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF ON ON 1 2 3 4 5...

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