Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target
64
Copyright
2013 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved.
Objectives
Description
SFRs
Purpose
FPT_STM.1
Supports audit
policies by requiring
time stamps
associated with
events.
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
Protection of User
and TSF Data from
unauthorized
disclosure or
alteration
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_CKM.4
Supports protection
by providing
cryptographic
operations for secure
communication and
enforces disk
encryption.
FTP_ITC.1
Enforces protection
by requiring the use
of trusted channels
for communication
of data over
Shared-medium
Interfaces.
6.7.
Rationale for Security
Assurance Requirements
This Security Target has been developed Using the IEEE Standard Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600™ -2008 Operational
Environment B (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009) and related SFR packages, EAL2+
augmented with ALC_FLR.2; which was created to describe Hardcopy
Devices used in commercial information processing environments that require
a moderate level of document security, network security, and security
assurance. The TOE environment will be exposed to only a low level of risk
because it is assumed that the TOE will be located in a restricted or
monitored environment that provides almost constant protection from
unauthorized and unmanaged access to the TOE and its data interfaces.
Agents cannot physically access any nonvolatile storage without
disassembling the TOE. Agents have limited or no means of infiltrating the
TOE with code to effect a change and the TOE self-verifies its executable
code to detect unintentional malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation Assurance
Level 2 is appropriate.
While IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 augments EAL2 with ALC_FLR.2, Flaw
reporting procedures, this ST augments EAL2 with ALC_FLR.3, Systematic
flaw remediation. ALC_FLR.3 is hierarchical to ALC_FLR.2 and
encompasses all requirements of ALC_FLR.2 plus some additional
requirements. ALC_FLR.3 ensures that instructions and procedures for the
reporting and remediation of identified security flaws are in place and their