Monticello Flying Club Pilot Transition Manual: Mooney M20F
Page 35 of 42
M20 SERIES HOURS FLOWN
vs.
ACCIDENTS 1991
Aircraft Registered
6,463
Active Aircraft
5,861
Total Fleet Hours
709,000
Hours per Aircraft
·
121
Yearly Accidents (1982-1991)
35
Accidents per 1,000 Hours
0.05
Hours per Accident
20,257
P
ILOT
T
IME
-I
N
-T
YPE
S
ERIOUS
A
CCIDENTS
H
ISTORY
Pilot experience is a powerful variable in aircraft accidents. As is true with most aircraft,
both the M20 and comparative group witness fewer accidents as pilots gain experience in the
particular model. Mooney places well compared to similar retractable gear aircraft. The M20 has
9% fewer accidents in the first 100 hours of a pilot's time than the comparative aircraft.
A
CCIDENT
D
ATA BY
P
RIMARY
C
AUSE
In the following sections we present discussions of each primary cause, together with the
associated pilot profile as suggested by the data. At the end of this chapter, detailed summary
data tables are presented for each prime cause.
A
DVERSE
W
EATHER
•
Weather and unfavorable environments (IMC/Turbulence/Night Conditions) were the leading
cause of accidents and fatalities, 16% and 48% respectively. While weather is related to one
sixth of the total accidents, it causes half of the fatalities. Coincidentally, the percentage of
total injuries associated with weather accidents is only 8%.
•
Most adverse weather accidents fall into 2 roughly equal groups: VFR rated pilots who enter
instrument meteorological conditions, and IFR rated pilot indiscretions during turbulence,
IFR descents and approaches.
The few remaining accidents were caused by induction system,
carburetor heat, and vacuum system misuse or malfunction.
•
The pilot profile for adverse weather accidents is characterized by high total time, average
Mooney time, low recent time, with 57% holding an instrument rating.
J
UDGMENT
•
Judgment applies to decisions and actions after the preflight, but not the impact of adverse
weather effects. These preventable accidents accounted for 14% of the total, 18% of the
fatalities and 16% of the injuries: Drugs/alcohol, low level "buzzing", improper mountain
operations, and power line impact by both IFR and VFR pilots accounted for the fatalities
and half the injuries. Additional injuries resulted from high density altitude operations, hand
propping and downwind takeoffs.
•
Pilots displaying poor judgment had above average total and Mooney times, low recent time
and 52% were instrument rated.
