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D5034 

- SIL 3 Switch/Proximity Interface 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

G.M. International ISM0113-7 

Functional Safety Manual and Application 

Application for D5034S or D5034D

 

Failure category

 

Failure rates (FIT)

 

λ

dd

 = Total Dangerous Detected failures 

125.63 

λ

du

 = Total Dangerous Undetected failures 

12.64 

λ

sd

 = Total Safe Detected failures 

0.00 

λ

su

 = Total Safe Undetected failures 

0.00 

λ

tot safe

 = Total Failure Rate (Safety Function) = 

λ

dd

 + 

λ

du

 + 

λ

sd

 + 

λ

su

 138.27

 

MTBF (safety function, single channel) = (1 / 

λ

tot safe

) + MTTR (8 hours) 

825 years

 

λ

no effect

 = “No Effect” failures 

182.53 

λ

not part

 = “Not Part” failures 

4.80 

λ

tot device

 = Total Failure Rate (Device) = 

λ

tot safe

 + 

λ

no effect

 + 

λ

not part

  

325.60

 

MTBF (device, single channel) = (1 / 

λ

tot device

) + MTTR (8 hours) 

350 years

 

λ

sd

 

λ

su

 

λ

dd

 

λ

du

 

SFF

 

0.00 FIT 

0.00 FIT 

125.63 FIT 

12.64 FIT 

90.86% 

DC

D

 

90.86% 

DC

S

 

0% 

T[Proof] = 1 year

 

T[Proof] = 17 years

 

PFDavg = 5.65 E-05

 

Valid for 

SIL 3

  PFDavg = 9.61 E-04

 

Valid for 

SIL 2

 

PFDavg vs T[Proof] table 

(assuming Proof Test coverage of 99%), with determination of SIL supposing module contributes >10% of total SIF dangerous failures: 

PFDavg vs T[Proof] table

 (assuming Proof Test coverage of 99%), with determination of SIL supposing module contributes 

10% of total SIF dangerous failures: 

Failure rates table according to IEC 61508:2010 Ed.2 : 

Failure rate table:

 

Safety Function and Failure behavior:

  

D5034 is considered to be operating in Low Demand mode, as a Type A module, having Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 0. 
The failure behaviour is described from the following definitions : 
 

 fail-Safe State: state is defined as the output going Low or High, considering that the safety logic solver can convert the Low or High fail (dangerous detected) to the fail-safe state;  

 

 fail Safe: failure mode that causes the module to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand from the process; 

 

 fail Dangerous: failure mode that does not respond to a demand from the process (i.e. being unable to go to the defined fail-safe state) or deviates the output current by  

    more than 5% (0.4 mA) of 8 mA full scale;  

   

 fail High: failure mode that causes the output signal to go above 7 mA (as short circuit of input). Assuming that the application program in the safety logic solver is  

    configured to detect High failure and does not automatically trip on this failure, this failure has been classified as a dangerous detected (DD) failure.    

   

 fail Low: failure mode that causes the output signal to go below 0.35 mA (as input line breakage). Assuming that the application program in the safety logic solver is  

    configured to detect Low failure and does not automatically trip on this failure, this failure has been classified as a dangerous detected (DD) failure.  
 

 fail “No Effect”: failure mode of a component that plays a part in implementing the safety function but that is neither a safe failure nor a dangerous failure. When calculating the  

    SFF, this failure mode is not taken into account;    
 

 fail “Not part”: failure mode of a component which is not part of the safety function but part of the circuit diagram and is listed for completeness. 

      When calculating the SFF this failure mode is not taken into account. 
The 2 channels of D5034D module could be used to increase the hardware fault tolerance, needed for a higher SIL of a certain Safety Function, as they are completely independent 
each other, not containing common components. In fact, the analysis results got for D5034S (single channel) are also valid for each channel of D5034D (double channel). 

  Failure rate date: taken from Siemens Standard SN29500. 

Description:

  

The module is powered by connecting 24 Vdc power supply to Pins 5 (+ positive) - 6 (- negative). The green LED is lit in presence of supply power. 
Voltage free contact or proximity detector are applied to Pins 7-8 (In 1 - Ch.1) and Pins 9-10 (In 2 - Ch.2). 
Sink output currents are applied to Pins 1-2 (for Channel 1) and Pins 3-4 (for Channel 2). 

T[Proof] = 10 years

 

PFDavg = 5.65 E-04

 

Valid for 

SIL 3

 

T[Proof] = 20 years

 

PFDavg = 1.13 E-03

 

Valid for 

SIL 2

 

Systematic capability SIL 3.

 

D5034S 

or 

D5034D 

Sink I  

Channel 1 

Channel 2 

(only for D5034D)

 

 

Out 2 

3 +  

4 - 

Safety 

PLC 

Input 

 

1 + 

2 - 

Out 1 

Safety 

PLC 

Input 

 

Supply  
24 Vdc 

5 + 

6 - 

+ 7 

- 8 

 

In 1 

+ 9 

 

In 2 

Proximity 

- 10 

Sink I  

 

 

 

R1 

R2 

Voltage free 

Contact 

Voltage free 

Contact 

Proximity 

 

 

 

R1 

R2 

Voltage free 

Contact 

Voltage free 

Contact 

Summary of Contents for D5034S

Page 1: ...D5034 SIL 3 Switch Proximity Interface G M International ISM0113 7 SIL 3 Switch Proximity Interface DIN Rail and Termination Board Models D5034S D5034D D5034S D5034D INSTRUCTION SAFETY MANUAL...

Page 2: ...to max supply change Load influence 0 05 of full scale for a 0 to 100 load resistance change Temperature influence 0 03 of full scale on zero and span for a 1 C change Compatibility CE mark compliant...

Page 3: ...TR n 898 NEPSI T V Certifications T V Functional Safety Certification Type Approval Certificate DNV and KR for maritime applications High Density two channels per unit Simplified installation using s...

Page 4: ...ve group See parameters indicated in the table below D5034 Terminals Ch1 Ch2 7 8 9 10 Ch1 Ch2 7 8 9 10 Io Isc 15 mA Ch1 Ch2 7 8 9 10 Po Po 39 mW Ii Imax Pi Pi D5034 Terminals D5034 Associated Apparatu...

Page 5: ...ector Power Bus PLC In 1 Proximity voltage free Contact In 2 Proximity voltage free Contact voltage free Contact voltage free Contact R1 R2 R1 R2 MODEL D5034S 5 6 1 2 7 8 mA Out SIL 3 RL PLC Terminati...

Page 6: ...at causes the output signal to go above 7 mA as short circuit of input Assuming that the application program in the safety logic solver is configured to detect High failure and does not automatically...

Page 7: ...field in order to go to open connection condition equivalent to line breakage and verify that the output current of the repeater reaches low current value 0 35 mA This tests for possible quiescent cur...

Page 8: ...ew terminal blocks which can be plugged in out into a powered unit without suffering or causing any damage for Zone 2 installations check the area to be nonhazardous before servicing The wiring cables...

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