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USER MANUAL
STM 550X / EMSIX
–
ENOCEAN MULTI-SENSOR
© 2020 EnOcean | www.enocean.com F-710-017, V1.0
STM 550x / EMSIx User Manual | v1.0 | February 2020 | Page 34/79
Figure 22 below illustrates the content authorization via a CMAC signature.
Figure 22
–
Telegram authentication
5.1.3
Dynamic security key modification
One fundamental problem with both content protection and content authorization is that us-
ing the same input data (plain text) with the same key always yields the same encrypted
data and the same signature.
This enables attacks based on monitoring previous system behaviour. If an attacker has
observed that a certain data telegram results in a certain light being turned on then he could
use this information to identify - or even actively send - similar telegrams in the future. This
type of attack is often called
Replay Attack
since it works by reusing (replaying) previously
used data telegrams.
In order to prevent this type of attack, either the telegram data or the security key must
change to ensure that identical input data does not create identical encrypted radio tele-
grams. The mechanism used by the transmitter to change the telegram data or the security
key has to be known to the receiver in order to correctly decrypt and authenticate received
data telegrams.
The change of telegram data or security key is typically ensured by means of monotonously
incrementing counters. The value of such counter is then used to either modify the telegram
payload or the security key. EnOcean systems use the latter approach.
Figure 23
–
Dynamic security key modification
Signature
Calculation
Input Data
Secret Key
Signature
Data
Signature
Data
Signature
Calculation
Secret Key
Compare
OK
Decryption
Dynamic Key
Unencrypted Data
(Plain Text)
Encryption
Unencrypted Data
(Plain Text)
Encrypted Data
Dynamic Key
Encrypted Data
Secret Key
Incrementing
Counter
Secret Key
Incrementing
Counter
Data Valid?
NO
YES