Cisco Cat4K NDPP ST
11 March 2014
EDCS-1228241
67
TOE SFRs
How the SFR is Met
FCS_COP.1(3)
The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-
3 “Secure Hash Standard.”
FCS_COP.1(4)
The TOE uses HMAC-SHA1. SHA-256, and SHA-512 message
authentication as part of the RADIUS Key Wrap functionality as
specified in FIPS Pub 198-1 “The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code” and FIPS PUB 180-3, “Secure Hash
Standard”.
In addition, The TOE provides MD5 hashing for authentication of
neighbor routers via BGPv4, EIGRP, EIGRPv6 for IPv6, RIPv2,
and OSPFv2 with shared passwords.
The hash mechanism is implemented as specified in the relevant
RFCs:
BGPv4 uses MD5 for authentication of routing updates as
defined in RFC 2385 (Protection of BGP Sessions via
TCP MD5 Signature Option).
EIGRP and EIGRPv6 (Cisco proprietary) uses MD5 for
authentication of routing updates.
RIPv2 uses MD5 for authentication of routing updates as
defined in Section 2.4 of RFC 2453.
OSPFv2 uses MD5 for authentication of routing updates
as defined in Appendix D of RFC 2328 (OSPF version 2).
Routing tables for IPv4 and IPv6 can be created and maintained
manually using static routes configured by the administrator. Use
of routing protocols in IPv4 or IPv6 is not required to support or
enforce any TOE security functionality including filtering of IPv4
or IPv6 traffic. BGPv4, EIGRP and EIGRPv6 supports MD5-
authenticated routing updates with IPv6 or IPv4 as does RIPv2
while OSPFv2 routing protocol support MD5-authenticated
routing updates for IPv4 only.
It is noted that per the FIPS Security Policy, that MD5 is not a
validated algorithm during FIPS mode of operation. For
additional security, it is recommended router protocol traffic also
be isolated to separate VLANs.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The TOE implements a random bit generator (RBG) based on the
AES-256 block cipher, as specified in FIPS Pub 140-2 Annex C:
X9.31 Appendix 2.4.