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D6038 

- SIL3 Line-Fault Transp. Switch/Prox. Repeater 

G.M. International ISM0433-0 

Functional Safety Manual and Application 

Application for double channel D6038DA or D6038DB

 

D6038DA 

or 

D6038DB 

(Ch.1 and Ch.2) 

OFF operation 

ON operation 

Field Input: proximity is OFF 

or switch is open 

Channel 1 

D6038DA 

or 

D6038DB 

(Ch.1 and Ch.2) 

Field Input: proximity is ON 

or switch is closed 

Channel 1 

 

Out 1 

8

 

 

In 1 

 

8

 

 

In 1 

 

 

Supply  
24 Vdc 

5 + 

6 - 

 

Supply  
24 Vdc 

5 + 

6 - 

Out 1 resistance value is RL (for 
direct function) or RH (for reverse 
function) 

Out 1 resistance value is RH (for 
direct function) or RL (for reverse 
function) 

Safety 

PLC 

Input 

 

Out 1 

Safety 

PLC 

Input 

Out 2 resistance value is RH (for 
direct function) or RL (for reverse 
function) 

 

Out 2 

Safety 

PLC 

Input 

10 

 

 

In 2 

 

Channel 2 

10 

 

 

In 2 

 

Channel 2 

 

Out 2 

Out 2 resistance value is RL (for 
direct function) or RH (for reverse 
function) 

Safety 

PLC 

Input 

Description:

  

For this application, for each channel enable input line fault (open or short) detection and choose direct or reverse input to output transfer function, by set the internal dip-switches in the 
following mode (for more information, please see the instruction manual ISM0431), where dip 1 and 2 are related to Ch.1 and dip 3 and 4 are related to Ch.2: 

Dip-switch position 

1 2 3  4 

ON/OFF state 

ON  OFF (direct) or ON (reverse)  ON  OFF (direct) or ON (reverse) 

  The module is powered by connecting 24 Vdc power supply to Pins 5 (+ positive) - 6 (- negative). The green LED is lit in presence of supply power. 

Input signals from field are applied to Pins 7-8 (In 1 - Ch.1) and Pins 9-10 (In 2 - Ch.2). Output Pins 1-2 (for Channel 1) and Output Pins 3-4 (for Channel 2) have got RH (direct 
function) or RL (reverse function) resistance value for OFF operation, while they have got RL (direct function) or RH (reverse function) resistance value for ON operation. The following 
table describes for each channel (Channel 1 or Channel 2) the output resistance value when its input signal is in OFF or ON state, and it gives information about turn-on or turn-off 
of its channel status LED and channel fault LED: 

Input 1 or Input 2 signal state 

Pins 7-8 (In 1 - Ch.1) or Pins 9-10 (In 2 - Ch.2) 

Out 1 or Out 2 resistance value 

Pins 1-2 (Out 1 - Ch.1) or Pins 3-4 (Out 2 - Ch.2) 

Ch.1 or Ch.2 status 

yellow LED state 

Ch.1 or Ch.2 fault 

red LED state 

Proximity sensor is OFF or switch is open 

RH (direct function) or RL (reverse function) 

OFF (direct function) 

ON (reverse function) 

OFF 

Proximity sensor is ON or switch is closed 

RL (direct function) or RH (reverse function) 

ON (direct function) 

OFF (reverse function) 

OFF 

Independently from proximity sensor or switch state, input line is broken 

RH (direct or reverse function) as safe state condition  OFF (direct or reverse 

function) 

ON 

Independently from proximity sensor or switch state, input line is short circuited  RH (direct or reverse function) as safe state condition  OFF (direct or reverse 

function) 

ON 

Safety Function and Failure behavior:

  

D6038D is considered to be operating in Low Demand mode, as a Type A module, having Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 0. 
For each channel, the failure behaviour is described from the following definitions : 
 

 fail-Safe State: it is defined as two cases: 1st) the channel output being open, with output resistance equal or bigger than RH ; 2nd) the channel output being in short circuit, 

     with output resistance equal to zero or very little than RL. The module output must be monitored by a Digital Input channel of a Safety PLC in order to detect open circuit (very 
     high resistance) or short circuit (very low resistance) of output channel; 
 

 fail Safe: failure mode that causes the module / (sub)system to go to the defined Fail-Safe state without a demand from the process; 

 

 fail Dangerous: failure mode that does not respond to a demand from the process (i.e. being unable to go to the defined Fail-Safe state), so that the channel output is blocked 

     in closed position, with output resistance equal or less than RL, but not equal to short circuit therefore not detectable by a Digital Input channel of a Safety PLC; 
 

 fail “No Effect”: failure mode of a component that plays a part in implementing the safety function but that is neither a safe failure or a dangerous failure. 

     When calculating the SFF this failure mode is not taken into account; 
 

 fail “Not part”: failure mode of a component which is not part of the safety function but part of the circuit diagram and is listed for completeness. 

     When calculating the SFF this failure mode is not taken into account. It is also not considered for the total failure rate (safety function) evaluation. 
Failure rate date: taken from Siemens Standard SN29500. 

Failure category

 

Failure rates (FIT)

 

λ

dd

 = Total Dangerous Detected failures 

0.00 

λ

du

 = Total Dangerous Undetected failures 

10.40 

λ

sd

 = Total Safe Detected failures 

0.00 

λ

su

 = Total Safe Undetected failures 

211.70 

λ

tot safe

 = Total Failure Rate (Safety Function) = 

λ

dd

 + 

λ

du

 + 

λ

sd

 + 

λ

su

 222.10

 

MTBF (safety function, one channel) = (1 / 

λ

tot safe

) + MTTR (8 hours) 

514 years

 

λ

no effect

 = “No Effect” failures 

244.90 

λ

not part

 = “Not Part” failures 

337.70 

λ

tot device

 = Total Failure Rate (Device) = 

λ

tot safe

 + 

λ

no effect

 + 

λ

not part

  

804.70

 

MTBF (device) = (1 / 

λ

tot device

) + MTTR (8 hours) 

142 years

 

λ

sd

 

λ

su

 

λ

dd

 

λ

du

 

SFF

 

0.00 FIT 

211.70 FIT 

0.00 FIT 

10.40 FIT 

95.3% 

Failure rates table according to IEC 61508:2010 Ed.2 : 

Failure rate table:

 

T[Proof] = 1 year

 

T[Proof] = 2 years

 

PFDavg = 4.56 E-05 Valid for 

SIL 3

  PFDavg = 9.13 E-05 Valid for 

SIL 3

 

PFDavg vs T[Proof] table 

(assuming Proof Test coverage of 99%), with determination of SIL supposing module contributes >10% of total SIF dangerous failures: 

PFDavg vs T[Proof] table 

(assuming Proof Test coverage of 99%), with determination of SIL supposing module contributes 

10% of total SIF dangerous failures: 

T[Proof] = 5 years

 

PFDavg = 2.28 E-04 Valid for 

SIL 3

 

SC3: Systematic capability SIL 3.

 

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