Dell S3048-ON, Configuration Manual

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• track the number of address requests per relay agent. Restricting the number of addresses available per relay agent can harden a
server against address exhaustion attacks.
• associate client MAC addresses with a relay agent to prevent offering an IP address to a client spoofing the same MAC address on a
different relay agent.
• assign IP addresses according to the relay agent. This prevents generating DHCP offers in response to requests from an unauthorized
relay agent.
The server echoes the option back to the relay agent in its response, and the relay agent can use the information in the option to forward a
reply out the interface on which the request was received rather than flooding it on the entire VLAN.
The relay agent strips Option 82 from DHCP responses before forwarding them to the client.
To insert Option 82 into DHCP packets, follow this step.
• Insert Option 82 into DHCP packets.
CONFIGURATION mode
ip dhcp relay information-option [trust-downstream]
For routers between the relay agent and the DHCP server, enter the
trust-downstream
option.
• Manually reset the remote ID for Option 82.
CONFIGURATION mode
ip dhcp relay information-option remote-id
DHCP Snooping
DHCP snooping protects networks from spoofing. In the context of DHCP snooping, ports are either trusted or not trusted.
By default, all ports are not trusted. Trusted ports are ports through which attackers cannot connect. Manually configure ports connected
to legitimate servers and relay agents as trusted.
When you enable DHCP snooping, the relay agent builds a binding table — using DHCPACK messages — containing the client MAC
address, IP addresses, IP address lease time, port, VLAN ID, and binding type. Every time the relay agent receives a DHCPACK on a trusted
port, it adds an entry to the table.
The relay agent checks all subsequent DHCP client-originated IP traffic (DHCPRELEASE, DHCPNACK, and DHCPDECLINE) against the
binding table to ensure that the MAC-IP address pair is legitimate and that the packet arrived on the correct port. Packets that do not pass
this check are forwarded to the server for validation. This checkpoint prevents an attacker from spoofing a client and declining or releasing
the real client’s address. Server-originated packets (DHCPOFFER, DHCPACK, and DHCPNACK) that arrive on a not trusted port are also
dropped. This checkpoint prevents an attacker from acting as an imposter as a DHCP server to facilitate a man-in-the-middle attack.
Binding table entries are deleted when a lease expires, or the relay agent encounters a DHCPRELEASE, DHCPNACK, or DHCPDECLINE.
DHCP snooping is supported on Layer 2 and Layer 3 traffic. DHCP snooping on Layer 2 interfaces does require a relay agent.
Binding table entries are deleted when a lease expires or when the relay agent encounters a DHCPRELEASE. Line cards maintain a list of
snooped VLANs. When the binding table is exhausted, DHCP packets are dropped on snooped VLANs, while these packets are forwarded
across non-snooped VLANs. Because DHCP packets are dropped, no new IP address assignments are made. However, DHCPRELEASE
and DHCPDECLINE packets are allowed so that the DHCP snooping table can decrease in size. After the table usage falls below the
maximum limit of 4000 entries, new IP address assignments are allowed.
NOTE: DHCP server packets are dropped on all not trusted interfaces of a system configured for DHCP snooping. To prevent
these packets from being dropped, configure
ip dhcp snooping trust
on the server-connected port.
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 255