REVELL ICONS OF AVIATION BATTLE OF BRITAIN Gift Set, Инструкция по сборке

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The term „Battle of Britain“ was coined by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during the summer of 1940. On the 30
th
June General Field Marshall Hermann Göring, Commender-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe
issued the order for the Luftwaffe to attack England. As well as working in close co-operation with the German Navy in the blockade of the English Ports, he stressed that the destruction of the Royal Air Force
and the Aviation Industry were primary objectives. Hitler cherished the hope, that he would be able to force Great Britain into peace negotiations through an intensive aerial attack. From the start of July the
German Luftwaffe transferred formations of Air Fleets 2 and 3 to airfields in Western France and Air Fleet 5 to airfields in Denmark and Norway. On 20
th
July the Air Wings had over 656 Bf109E and 864 twin
engine bombers at its disposal, as well as 200 Bf110 and 248 Stuka. As well as these 1968 fully operational aircraft, were a further 1025 aircraft in reserve and available for reconnaissance flights. On 1st July
the RAF Fighter Command under Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding had 591 operational fighters, 347 Hurricanes and 160 Spitfires as well as 1200 pilots at its disposal. Up to September 1940 therefore,
only small fighter formations were generally deployed for air defence in order to always have suitable reserves available. The 10
th
July was later defined as the start of the „Battle of Britain“. On the German
side the 13
th
August was seen as the first day of the air battle. Up to the 11
th
August the Luftwaffe flew more than 7000 bomber missions. During this period, the sinking of over 71000 Gross Register Tons
of British Merchant Shipping and the dropping of 1930 tons of bombs – on the German side known as the „Battle of the Channel“ - was dearly bought with the loss of 274 aircraft. A further 59 aircraft were
lost in accidents. Attacks on targets along the coast and shipping in the English Channel and the Thames estuary took place during the day. Targets inland were attacked during night. During this period the
RAF lost 182 aircraft. With the „Führers Order“ Number 17 on 1
st
August, Adolf Hitler ordered the destruction of the RAF and its ground support in preparation for an invasion of the British Isles („Operation
See Lion“).
Shortly before hand, the start of the invasion was postponed from the middle of August to the 17
th September. The High Command of the Luftwaffe subsequently developed the plan „Adlerangriff“ (Eagle
Attack). All the important airfields and radar stations in the area around London should be destroyed within 13 days. The RAF fighter squadrons would be forced to fight and could be destroyed. The achieve-
ment of air superiority of the airspace over southern England was considered to be an essential pre-requisite for a successful invasion. By the end of September 1940 the invasion plans had already been secret-
ly abandoned. The Luftwaffe High Commend was convinced that the RAF fighter defence could be destroyed by attrition. Many decisive factors however were wrongly assessed or not considered. They esti-
mated that monthly fighter production would be between 180 and 330 aircraft. In July however the British aircraft industry delivered 496 and in August 476 fighters. They could therefore compensate com-
pletely for aircraft losses. German monthly production lay in contrast by 230 fighters. The RAF’s weakness however was to be found in the training of its pilots. In Germany around 800 pilots left flying train-
ing every month. In Great Britain only a little over 200 new pilots came to the squadrons each month.
The Germans had no perception of the RAF’s fighter control system. Since 1937 the “Chain Home“ radar stations had been established along the British Coastline and were directed seawards towards high alti-
tude incoming targets.“Chain Home Low“ stations were to acquire low flying aircraft.
The German bomber formations could therefore be acquired even over their French airfields. All RAF aircraft were also fitted with an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) transmitter. In Fighter Command
Headquarters at Bentley Priory, all incoming enemy formations were therefore detected in good time. From there the „Operation Rooms“ of the „Sector Stations“ received their assignments to scramble and
direct the fighters. Each „Sector Station“ was responsible for between two and four fighter squadrons. The British airspace was divided into four Fighter Groups. The fighters were directed to intercept the enemy
via radio-telephony. The Luftwaffe High Command under estimated the effectiveness of this system. Little effort was therefore extended to the systematic destruction of the radar stations. For the German crews
the journey across the English Channel proved to be extremely problematic.
Conceived as a light interceptor fighter, the fuel capacity of the Bf109 only allowed a combat loiter time of 30 minutes after reaching the English coast. Additional fuel tanks to improve its range were not avail-
able. Although the Bf110 had the necessary range available, it proved to be inadequate against the RAF fighters. The German pilots were better equipped for abandoning their aircraft over the sea or for an
emergency ditching but the cold waters of the English Channel were often a deadly trap. Every German crew that arrived on English soil after an emergency landing or abandoning his aircraft went into cap-
tivity, whilst after ditching or an emergency landing, RAF pilots were often ready for action once again after only a short period of time. The first phase of the battle lasted from 12
th
until 23
rd
August. It was
initiated on „Adlertag“ (Eagle Day), the 13
th
August . On the previous day over 200 bombers attacked four radar stations and fighter aircraft on airfields near the coast. In this way the radar system was to be
blinded. Actually the radar stations were in action once again after only a few hours. „Adlertag“ was the start of a series of large attacks against RAF installations, radar stations near the coast and Royal Navy
establishments. An attack by the 5
th Air Fleet on the north of England with bombers and Bf110 escort aircraft followed on 15 th August. The assumption that the air defences were only concentrated in the
south of England proved to be false. On this „Greatest Day“, the Luftwaffe lost more than 70 aircraft during 1786 sorties against only 29 losses by the RAF. On 18
th
August 1940 the Ju87’s of StG2, 3 and 77
(Dive-bomber Squadrons) took such heavy losses after their attacks on airfields and radar stations that all further Stuka missions over England were suspended on the orders of Hermann Göring. But Fighter
Command also had to take heavy losses with 30 fallen pilots and 136 aircraft destroyed. On the evening of the „Hardest Day“ 100 Luftwaffe aircraft were destroyed or heavily damaged and 79 aircrew lost or
captured. Göring also ordered the cessation of what he thought to be useless attacks on the radar installations. The attempt to achieve air superiority over southern England had failed. Inside 10 days the
Luftwaffe had lost 136 officers. During the period between 24
th
August and 6
th
September the second wave of attacks by the Luftwaffe were mainly orientated against airfields and aircraft factories in south-
ern England. This caused the 11 th Fighter Group great problems at their bases. Göring’s claim that the RAF Air Defence only had 50 Spitfires at their disposal defied all reality. The daily loses of RAF fighter pilots
however could not be compensated for. In contrast, the number of deployable fighter aircraft was always over 650 machines. Just how much the RAF’s air defence was weakened through the German attacks
remained concealed from the Luftwaffe High Command. On 7
th
September the main effort of the bombing attacks was shifted to the area around London. The RAF’s night attack on Berlin on 25
th
August was
the reason for Hitlers order to bomb London as a counter attack. This 3
rd
phase lasted until 19
th
September, during which Fighter Command had time to recover. In order to defend London the 12
th
Fighter
Group now came into action as well. For the first time the attackers were met by numerically superior groups of British fighters. The 4
th
phase of the Battle from 20
th
September until 13
th
October was char-
acterised with fighter-bomber attacks on London both by day and night. After the 29
th
October heavy attacks against London with bombers were transferred into the night. The Knickebein Radio Navigation
System was developed for this purpose. Radio beams from widely spaced transmitter stations crossed each other over the target area. These guidance beams however could be successfully jammed by the
RAF. The Luftwaffe subsequently developed a special bomb release system known as the X-Unit. Aircraft of Fighter Group 100 were equipped with this unit and operated as „Pathfinders“ and „Illuminator’s“.
After arrival over the target the „Pathfinders“ illuminated the target with incendiary bombs. From June 1941 this system was also discovered in Great Britain and therefore became useless. British historians
attribute the end of the battle to 31
st
October 1940, because after this date, day time attacks by the Luftwaffe ceased. On the German side they also include the last phase up to May 1941, during which night
attacks were also flown against targets all over England. The night attacks on Coventry on 14
th
November and 8
th
April 1941 were up until then the heaviest bombing raids of the war. As well as a large num-
ber of civilian deaths and many thousand destroyed houses, around 75 percent of the factories lay in rubble. During the air attacks up to the end of April 1941 a total of 27,450 civilians were killed and 32,138
wounded. Between 10
th
July and 31
st
October the RAF lost 544 pilots and 1547 aircraft. 915 aircraft were shot down in aerial combat. Up to May 1941 the Luftwaffe lost more than 4600 men, of which 2600
were missing in action or prisoners of war. Out of 2200 aircraft destroyed during the period 10
th
July until 31
st
October, 1733 aircraft were shot down in aerial combat. For the Luftwaffe these losses were hard
to bear, as industrial production could not keep pace. The high personnel losses were however the hardest to bear. Enormous quantities of raw materials, fuel and bombs were often used without planning or
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